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imports flow through wholesalers and retailers versus .producing and consuming firms. 
 
Keywords:  Wholesaler, retailer, intermediary, international trade 
JEL Classifications:  F10, F14 
 
 
This paper was produced as part of the Centre’s Globalisation Programme.  The Centre for 
Economic Performance is financed by the Economic and Social Research Council. 
 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
Schott (SES- 0550190) thanks the NSF and Redding thanks the ESRC funded Centre for 
Economic Performance for financial support. The research in this paper was conducted at the 
U.S. Census Research Data Centers, and support from NSF (ITR- 0427889) is acknowledged 
gratefully. We thank Daniel Reyes for research assistance and Jim Davis for speedy 
disclosure. Any opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the authors and do 
not necessarily represent the views of the NSF or the U.S. Census Bureau. Results have been 
reviewed to ensure that no confidential information is disclosed.  
 Andrew B. Bernard is Professor of International Economics, Tuck School of Business at 
Dartmouth and NBER. J. Bradford Jensen is an Associate Professor of International Business and 
Economics at the McDonough School of Business at Georgetown University, Washington, DC, a 
senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, and a research associate of NBER. 
Stephen J. Redding is Director of the Globalisation Programme at the Centre for Economic 
Performance and Professor of Economics in the Economics Department at the London School of 
Economics. Peter K. Schott is Professor of Economics, Yale School of Management and NBER.  
 
 
 
Published by 
Centre for Economic Performance 
London School of Economics and Political Science 
Houghton Street 
London WC2A 2AE 
 
All rights reserved.  No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval 
system or transmitted in any form or by any means without the prior permission in writing of 
the publisher nor be issued to the public or circulated in any form other than that in which it 
is published. 
 
Requests for permission to reproduce any article or part of the Working Paper should be sent 
to the editor at the above address. 
 
© A. B. Bernard, J. B. Jensen, S. J. Redding and P. K. Schott, submitted 2010 
Wholsalers and Retailers in U.S. Trade 2
1. Introduction
International trade models typically assume that producers in one country trade di-
rectly with nal consumers in another. In the real world, of course, trade can involve long
chains of potentially independent actors who move goods through wholesale and retail
distribution networks. These networks likely a¤ect the magnitude and nature of trade
frictions and hence both the pattern of trade and its welfare gains. To promote further
understanding of the means by which goods move across borders, this paper examines the
extent to which U.S. exports and imports ow through wholesalers and retailers versus
producing and consumingrms. We highlight a number of stylized facts about these
intermediaries, and show that their attributes can deviate substantially from the portrait
of trading rms that has emerged from microdata in recent years.
We combine data on individual trade transactions from U.S. customs records with
comprehensive information on rmsemployment from the Census Bureaus business reg-
ister. We dene purewholesalers and retailers to be importers or exporters with 100
percent of their U.S. employment in either of those two sectors. These rms account
for large shares of exporters and importers but relatively little export and import value.
We dene pureproducing and consuming rms to be those with zero employment in
wholesaling and retailing. These rms arguably the closest analog to the hypothetical
trading rm in much of the heterogeneous-rm literature in international trade ac-
count for relatively large shares of rms but moderate amounts of value. The remaining
mixedrms are the rarest but by far the largest in terms of value. Distinguishing be-
tween mixedrms that have more and less than three quarters of their employment in
wholesaling plus retailing, we nd the latter dominate.
Pure wholesalers and retailers di¤er from pure producer and consumer rms along a
number of dimensions: they are smaller in terms of employment, trade value and domestic
sales, operate fewer U.S. establishments and are present in fewer U.S. states. Mixed
rms, on the other hand, are substantially larger. They trade more products, trade with
more countries, and are more likely to engage in related-party trade.
Intermediariesexistence indicates that they overcome barriers to international trade
at lower cost than at least some producer and consumer rms. As a result, we examine
whether the scope and intensity of wholesale and retail trade varies with product and
country characteristics related to these costs as well as foreign demand.1 We nd partic-
ipation in product-country markets to be well below one hundred percent for all types of
rms, and especially low for pure retailers and mixed-wholesaler-retailers. This variation
in participation appears related to product and country attributes. Wholesalerstrade is
disproportionately concentrated in agriculture-related sectors and is relatively less sensi-
1For theoretical explanations of intermediation see James E. Rauch and Joel Watson (2004), Bernardo
Blum, Sebastian Claro and Ig Horstmann (2008), Anders Akerman (2009), JaeBin Ahn, Amit Khandelwal
and Shang-Jin Wei (2009), Pol Antràs and Arnaud Costinot (2009) and Dimitra Petropoulou (2007).
Wholsalers and Retailers in U.S. Trade 3
tive to market size than other types of rmstrade, with the result that wholesalers have
relatively greater penetration of small markets than the other types of rms. Retailers
and mixed wholesaler-retailerstrade, on the other hand, is relatively insensitive to dis-
tance, likely due to their concentration in consumer goods such as clothing and footwear
that are sourced disproportionately from far-away China.
2. Data
Our results focus on 2002 but we note that results for other years are similar. We
use the U.S. Linked/Longitudinal Firm Trade Transaction Database (LFTTD), which
matches individual U.S. trade transactions to U.S. rms in the Longitudinal Business
Database (LBD).2 For each export and import transaction, we observe the U.S.-based rm
engaging in the transaction, the ten-digit Harmonized System (HS) classication of the
product shipped, the (nominal) value shipped, the shipment date, the destination or source
country, and whether the transaction takes place at arms lengthor between related
parties.3 For importers, we also observe an identier for the manufacturer or shipper from
which the import was received, and we use this eld to identify each importers number
of foreign partner rms. Via the LBD, we observe rms employment according to
the major-industry of each of its establishments (i.e., plants). This information allows
us to compute the share of rmsU.S. employment across nine broad sectors, including
wholesale and retail (NAICS sectors 42 and 44 to 45, respectively). Firms with only a
single establishment in the United States necessarily have 100 percent of their employment
in a single sector.
Table 1 reports weighted average employment shares across sectors for several types
of exporters and importers dened below, where rmsemployment shares are weighted
by their share of export and import value respectively. The rst column of each panel
reports results for all trading rms appearing in our data. We nd that wholesale and retail
employment generally is higher among importers than exporters. On average importers
have 27 percent of their employment in wholesale and 7 percent in retail, which compares
with 18 percent and 2 percent respectively for exporters. Outside of wholesaling and
retailing, manufacturing is the dominant employment category, more so for exporters than
for importers. Service sector employment, on the other hand, is higher among importers,
particularly PC rms (dened below).
Among trading rms, we consider two categories of pureintermediaries: pure whole-
salers (W), who have 100 percent of their U.S. employment in wholesaling, and pure re-
tailers (R) who have 100 percent of their U.S. employment in retailing.4 We compare W
2We link 80 percent of transactions by value; see Andrew B. Bernard, J. Bradford Jensen and Peter
K. Schott (2009) for more details.
3Ownership thresholds for relatedness are 10 percent (exports) and 6 percent (imports).
4Most but not all of the purerms are single-establishment rms. Firms with employment split
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and R to two other types of rms: pureproducers or consumers (PC), which have zero
wholesale and retail employment, and mixedrms, which have wholesale plus retail
employment between 0 and 100 percent. To explore the ramications of using a sharp
100 percent cuto¤ in dening W and R rms, we further divide mixed rms into mixed
wholesale-retail(MWR) and mixed producer-consumer(MPC) according to whether
wholesaling plus retailing accounts for more or less than 75 percent of employment.5 As
indicated in Table 1, MPC rms have their employment disproportionately concentrated
in manufacturing. The non-wholesale-retail employment of MWR rms, in contrast, is
tilted towards services.
Together, W, R, PC, MWR and MPC rms are mutually exclusive and exhaustive.
Unfortunately, we cannot compare rms in the LFTTD to those which trade indirectly
via wholesalers or retailers as we do not observe the latters sales or purchases within the
United States.
Table 2 reports the share of each type of rm among exporters and importers in 2002,
as well as the share of total U.S. exports and imports for which they are responsible.
Collectively, pure wholesalers and retailers account for large shares of trading rms but
relatively little value, with wholesalers being four to ve times more prevalent and re-
sponsible for considerably more trade. PC rms are most numerous on the export side
and as numerous as Ws on the import side, and represent roughly one fth each of export
and import value. Mixed rms are rarest but account for the majority of U.S. trade; this
dominance is stronger for exports than imports, though MWR importers are relatively
more important for imports than for exports. The country composition of trade also
di¤ers substantially across rm types and between exports and imports, with W, R and
MWR importers having by far the largest shares of trade with China.6
3. Wholesaler and Retailer Premia
It is well known that trading rms di¤er from purely domestic rms along a number
of dimensions (e.g., Bernard et al. 2007). Here, we demonstrate substantial heterogeneity
within trading rms.
Table 3 reports non-PC rmspremiarelative to PC rms in 2002. Each cell reports
the result of a di¤erent rm- (top panel) or rm-product-country- (bottom panel) level
OLS regression of the noted characteristic on a dummy variable for the noted rm type.
Each regression sample includes all rms of the noted type as well as PC rms. Regressions
in the top panel include rmmajor six-digit HS category xed e¤ects as well as controls for
rm employment deciles (except in the rst row). Regressions summarized in the bottom
between wholesale and retail are allocated to W or R according to whichever is higher.
5MWR rms typically have only wholesale (most common) or only retail employment.
6See Emek Basker and Pham Hoang Van (2008a,b) for further evidence of the contribution of retailers
to import growth from China.
Wholsalers and Retailers in U.S. Trade 5
panel include product-country xed e¤ects and also use employment-decile dummies to
control for rm size.
Firm-level attributes considered in the top panel of Table 3 include domestic em-
ployment, total trade value and total domestic sales (from across all economic censuses in
which the rm is present), the number of country partners, the number of products traded,
the value-weighted mean per capita GDP of rmscountry destinations or sources, the
number of foreign partner rms (imports only), the number of U.S. establishments and
the number of U.S. states in which the rm has an establishment.7 Firm-product-country
attributes considered in the bottom panel of the gure include: trade value; overall, arms-
length and related-party unit values (i.e., value divided by quantity); and related-party
share (i.e., value with related-parties divided by total value).
Relative to PC rms, W and R exporters and importers have lower employment and,
within size deciles, have lower domestic sales, operate fewer establishments, operate in
fewer states and trade more products per country.8 MWR exporters and importers, in
contrast, are substantially larger than PC rms: they trade more products, trade with
more countries, trade more products per country and, on the import side, interact with
more foreign partner rms, though only W importers trade with more foreign partners
per product per country than PC rms. MPC rms are also relatively large; they trade
signicantly more value at the product-country level than PC rms and are substantially
more likely to engage in trade with related parties. W, R and MWR importers all trade
with countries with a lower average GDP per capita than PC rms.
Results with respect to unit values are less clear. Perhaps intuitively, W, R and MWR
exporters have relatively low unit values within product-country cells and rm size deciles
than either MPC or PC rms. On the other hand, while W and MWR importers have
relatively low unit values, we nd that R importers have relatively high unit values.
A nal comparison of rm types, in Table 8, relates to the concentration of trade.
We nd W, R and MWR trade to be less concentrated among large rms than PC and
MPC trade. While the top one (ve) percent of W exporters and importers account for
0.47 (0.73) and 0.41 (0.67) of W exports and imports, respectively, the top one (ve)
percent of PC rms account for 0.60 (0.83) and 0.77 (0.90) of PC exports and imports,
respectively. R and MWR rms are similarly less concentrated, while MPC rms are
similarly concentrated. These results indicate that the extreme concentration of trade
observed in microdata in recent years is driven by PC and MPC rms.
7The coe¢ cient in the rst cell of the top panel, for example, indicates that exporting wholesalers
have on average 60 percent (1  e 0:91) of the employment of PC rms.
8Manipulation of the coe¢ cients in Table 3 allows comparison of products per country and, on the
import side, foreign rms per product per country.
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4. Product-Country Determinants of Intermediation
The third column of each panel in Table 2 reveals that R and MWR rms participate
in far lower shares of product-country markets than W, PC and MPC rms.9 Even among
the latter, however, participation is well below 100 percent. In this section, we examine
the product and country characteristics that inuence the markets in which each type of
trading rm participates.
The left and right panels of Table 4 report correlations across products of the share
of trade value accounted for by each type of exporter and importer in 2002, respectively.
Two trends stand out. First, intermediaries correlations with non-intermediaries are
negative for both exporters and importers, indicating these rmsspecialize in di¤erent
sets of goods. Second, the shares of PC and MPC rms are also negatively correlated.
This result suggests producer and consumer rms may develop in-house wholesaling or
retailing capabilities depending on the products they produce, or vice versa.
Table 5 reports the distribution of export and import value across rm types for
aggregations of two-digit HS categories. As indicated in the table, Ws tend to concentrate
in agriculture-related sectors such as Animal and Vegetable products in both exports and
imports. PC and MPCs, on the other hand, focus more on industries more likely to
contain di¤erentiated goods, such as Transportation. Among importers, we nd that
MWRs are disproportionately active in Textiles, Clothing and Footwear.
We also nd a positive and statistically signicant correlation across products between
the trade value shares of exporters versus importers of each rm type. This correlation
exists both across the two-digit HS categories reported in Table 5 and across six-digit HS
categories (see the diagonal of Table 6), which are the most detailed level at which export
and import HS codes can be compared. The fact that importers and exporters of a given
rm type participate in similar products suggests the importance of product attributes in
driving intermediation.
Evidence on the country characteristics inuencing trade participation is reported in
Table 7, which displays the distribution of U.S. trade by type of rm in 2002 according
to destination- or source-country GDP quintile. As indicated in the table, the share of
exports (imports) mediated by pure wholesalers declines with market size, from 0.20 (0.25)
for the smallest quintile of destination (source) markets to 0.07 (0.14) for the largest. For
MPC exporters and importers, we nd the opposite trend, i.e., an increase in the share of
trade from these rms as market size grows. Patterns for PC rms are less regular, but
for both exports and imports, shares decline with market size after the rst quintile. We
explore these relationships further in the context of gravityin the next section.
9The denominator of these shares is the total number of product-country cells in which the United
States is present.
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5. Gravity
A long line of research in international trade highlights the importance of gravityin
determining trade ows. Here, we examine the inuence of gravity for di¤erent types of
trading rms.
Table 9 reports the results of three, country-level OLS regressions. In the top panel,
log aggregate trade value is regressed on partner countrieslog GDP and log great-circle
distance from the United States (in km).10 In the second and third panels, the extensive
and intensive components of log value, i.e., the log number of rm-product observations
with positive trade and the log average value per rm-product observation with positive
trade, are regressed on these variables. As these components sum to log aggregate value,
the coe¢ cients reported in the second and third panels sum to their respective coe¢ cients
reported in the rst panel.
Results for exports are straightforward: trade value falls with distance and rises with
market size. Moreover, gravitys stronger e¤ect on extensive versus intensive margins
across the board is consistent with recent research on the margins of trade (Bernard et al.
2007, 2009). Comparing the coe¢ cient on GDP across columns, we nd W trade is less
sensitive to market size than MPC trade, consistent with the formers declining market
share across GDP quintiles noted above. This di¤erential response is disproportionately
due to the intensive margin. As indicated in the bottom panel, coe¢ cients on log GDP
are relatively larger for MWR and MPC versus other types of rms than in the middle
panel.
Results for imports are less conventional. While we nd the expected positive re-
lationship between market size and import value across the three panels, distance has
a negative and statistically signicant relationship with import value only for PC and
MPC rms. For intermediaries, the relationship is negative but statistically insignicant
for Ws and positive but statistically insignicant for Rs and MWRs. One factor con-
tributing to this result is the above-noted relatively heavy concentration of retailers and
mixed wholesale-retailers in consumer goods such as textiles, clothing and footwear that
are disproportionately imported from far-away China. As indicated in the nal column
of Table 2, a relatively large share of W, R and MWR rms import value originates
in China.11 Indeed, R and MWR importersvalue shares across the industries in Table
5 are strongly positively correlated with Chinas import market shares in those indus-
tries. Analogous correlations with respect to PC and MPC rmsshares are negative but
statistically insignicant.12
10These data are from the World Bank and CEPII, respectively. The mean (standard deviation) of
these variables are 25 (2) and 8 (0.7), respectively.
11A similar trend is noted with respect low-wage countries more generally, e.g., those with less than 5
or 10 percent of U.S. per capita GDP as in Schott (2003). As noted in Table 3, W, R and MWR rms
tend to import from countries with lower per-capita GDP than PC and MPC rms.
12Chinas import market shares across the rows listed in Table 5 are 0.06, 0.02, 0.03, 0.01, 0.03, 0.15,
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6. Conclusions
Trading rms exhibit substantial heterogeneity and can be quite di¤erent from the
stylizedtrading rm emphasized in much of the recent literature in international trade.
While pure wholesalers are relatively numerous, they are on average smaller than pure
producers, and account for a relatively small share of trade value. While pure wholesalers
are concentrated in agriculture-related sectors, pure producers and mixed rms are more
prevalent in industries more likely to contain di¤erentiated goods such as transportation.
Pure wholesalers are relatively less sensitive to market size and import disproportionately
from China and other low-wage countries. Together with di¤erences in product special-
ization, this leads to departures on the import side from the standard gravity equation
predictions for trade.
0.55, 0.07, 0.13, 0.66, 0.09, 0.12, 0.14, 0.01, 0.30, 0.03 and 0.11, respectively.
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Table 1: Distribution of Firm Employment by Type of Firm, 2002
Employment All PC MWR MPC All PC MWR MPC
Wholesale 0.18 na 0.74 0.12 0.27 na 0.40 0.16
Retail 0.02 na 0.13 0.02 0.07 na 0.48 0.04
Agriculture 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Mining 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01
Construction 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
Manufacturing 0.55 0.66 0.04 0.60 0.35 0.37 0.03 0.50
TCU 0.05 0.14 0.02 0.03 0.08 0.25 0.02 0.05
FIRE 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.03
Other Services 0.16 0.14 0.07 0.19 0.19 0.36 0.06 0.20
Exporting Firms Importing Firms
Notes: Table reports weighted-average share of firm employment by sector across
firms, by type of firm (see text), using firms' total exports or imports as weights. TCU
is transportation, communication and utilities. FIRE is finance, insurance and real
estate. Other services includes education and healthcare. Zeros are due to
rounding. Data are for 2002.
Table 2: Distribution of Firm Types and the Trade Value for Which They Account, 2002
Firm
Type
Share of
Firms
Share of
Export
Value
Share of
Product-
Countries
China
Value
Share
Share of
Importing
Firms
Share of
Import
Value
Share of
Product-
Countries
China
Value
Share
W 0.34 0.08 0.45 0.05 0.42 0.15 0.53 0.21
R 0.09 0.01 0.08 0.00 0.13 0.01 0.18 0.35
PC 0.52 0.22 0.58 0.03 0.40 0.21 0.56 0.07
MWR 0.01 0.02 0.11 0.00 0.01 0.08 0.18 0.30
MPC 0.04 0.67 0.60 0.04 0.04 0.55 0.55 0.06
Exporting Firms Importing Firms
Notes: First two columns of each panel reports a breakdown of firms and the share of value for
which they account; these columns sum to unity. Second two columns of each panel report the
share of all U.S. product-country cells in which each type of firm is present and each type's share
of trade value with China. Zeros are due to rounding. Data are for 2002.
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Table 3: PremiaRelative to PC Firms, 2002
ln(Employmentf) -0.91 *** -0.80 *** 2.67 *** 2.76 *** -1.16 *** -0.96 *** 2.80 *** 2.77 ***
0.01 0.03 0.06 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.08 0.04
ln(Valuef) -0.02 *** -0.02 ** 0.11 *** 0.50 *** 0.00 -0.01 0.29 *** 0.35 ***
0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.03
ln(Domestic Salesf) -0.09 *** -0.19 *** 2.98 *** 2.44 *** -0.60 *** -0.53 *** 2.55 *** 2.40 ***
0.01 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.06 0.04
ln(Countriesf) -0.01 -0.05 *** 0.14 *** 0.40 *** -0.08 *** 0.00 0.28 *** 0.38 ***
0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02
ln(Productsf) 0.06 *** -0.02 ** 0.31 *** 0.52 *** 0.00 0.13 *** 0.46 *** 0.39 ***
0.01 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.02
ln(Mean PCGDPf) -0.13 *** 0.02 ** 0.01 0.04 *** -0.18 *** -0.04 ** -0.05 ** 0.11 ***
0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.02
ln(Partnersf) 0.03 *** 0.09 *** 0.54 *** 0.49 ***
0.01 0.01 0.03 0.02
ln(Establishmentsf) -0.07 *** 0.02 ** 2.40 *** 1.83 *** -0.16 *** -0.05 *** 2.42 *** 1.84 ***
0.00 0.01 0.08 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.02
ln(Statesf) -0.04 *** -0.04 *** 1.17 *** 1.11 *** -0.10 *** -0.06 *** 1.19 *** 1.16 ***
0.00 0.00 0.06 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.02
ln(Valuefpc) -0.09 *** 0.00 -0.16 *** 0.19 *** 0.16 *** -0.08 *** 0.62 *** 0.29 ***
0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
ln(Unit Valuefpc) -0.14 *** -0.08 *** -0.17 *** -0.06 *** -0.20 *** 0.02 ** -0.03 *** 0.03 ***
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
ln(RP Sharefpc) -0.83 *** 0.61 *** 4.08 *** 10.58 *** 3.44 *** 1.63 *** 0.14 7.06 ***
0.07 0.15 0.25 0.11 0.11 0.14 0.16 0.13
Firm-Level OLS Regressions
Product-Country-Level OLS Regressions
Notes: Each cell reports the results of a different firm OLS regression of noted characteristic on a dummy
variable for noted firm type versus PC firms. Top- (bottom-) panel regressions include major six-digit HS
category (product-country) fixed effects. All regressions except those in first row control for firm size (see text).
Robust standard errors clustered according to the fixed effects are reported below coefficients. ***, ** and *
denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels. Data are for 2002.
W
Exporting Firms Importing Firms
R MWR MPCW R MWR MPC
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Table 4: Correlations Across Products of the Share of Trade Value Accounted for by Each
Type of Firm, 2002
PC MPC W R PC MPC W R
MPC -0.63 -0.36
W -0.25 -0.53 -0.38 -0.55
R -0.05 -0.18 0.04 -0.09 -0.17 -0.05
MWR -0.12 -0.19 0.03 0.03 -0.21 -0.23 -0.11 0.03
Exports Imports
Notes: Table displays correlations across ten-digit HS export (left
panel) and import (right panel) products of the share of trade value
accounted for by each type of firm. All correlations are statistically
significant at the 1 percent level. Data are for 2002.
Table 5: Share of IndustriesTrade Due to W, R, PC and MPC Firms, 2002
HS Categories W R PC MWR MPC W R PC MWR MPC
01-05 Animal 0.23 0.01 0.23 0.02 0.51 0.54 0.01 0.18 0.05 0.21
06-15 Vegetable 0.21 0.00 0.10 0.08 0.60 0.47 0.02 0.10 0.13 0.27
16-24 Foodstuffs 0.11 0.01 0.19 0.02 0.68 0.44 0.01 0.11 0.11 0.33
25-27 Minerals 0.10 0.00 0.23 0.01 0.66 0.06 0.00 0.50 0.02 0.43
28-38 Chemicals 0.05 0.00 0.19 0.01 0.74 0.09 0.00 0.14 0.07 0.69
39-40 Plastics / Rubber 0.06 0.00 0.26 0.01 0.66 0.23 0.01 0.19 0.06 0.51
41-43 Hides, Skins 0.36 0.01 0.23 0.04 0.36 0.35 0.04 0.16 0.22 0.23
44-49 Wood 0.15 0.01 0.27 0.05 0.51 0.28 0.02 0.27 0.12 0.31
50-63 Textiles, Clothing 0.11 0.01 0.30 0.02 0.55 0.26 0.03 0.13 0.28 0.30
64-67 Footwear 0.18 0.16 0.22 0.05 0.39 0.26 0.10 0.06 0.24 0.34
68-71 Stone / Glass 0.24 0.02 0.36 0.01 0.37 0.21 0.03 0.52 0.06 0.18
72-83 Metals 0.11 0.01 0.29 0.02 0.57 0.27 0.01 0.17 0.07 0.48
84-85 Mach / Elec 0.06 0.00 0.23 0.03 0.68 0.15 0.01 0.18 0.07 0.60
86-89 Transportation 0.03 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.83 0.04 0.00 0.11 0.02 0.82
90-97 Miscellaneous 0.07 0.01 0.33 0.02 0.57 0.18 0.03 0.23 0.15 0.41
98-99 Special 0.07 0.01 0.43 0.01 0.48 0.11 0.02 0.36 0.01 0.50
01-99 All 0.08 0.01 0.22 0.02 0.67 0.15 0.01 0.21 0.08 0.55
Export Value Import Value
Notes: Table reports share of each type of firm in noted industry's trade, i.e., rows sum to 1. Zeros are due
to rounding. Data are for 2002.
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Table 6: Correlations Across Products of Share of Trade Value Accounted for by Each
type of Exporting versus Importing Firm, 2002
PC MPC W R MWR
PC 0.18 -0.11 -0.04 -0.02 -0.05
MPC -0.22 0.40 -0.26 -0.10 -0.08
W 0.07 -0.27 0.28 0.05 0.03
R 0.05 -0.14 0.08 0.16 0.06
MWR -0.02 -0.10 0.07 0.08 0.20
Notes: Table displays correlations across six-digit HS
products of the share of trade value accounted for by
each type of exporter (row) versus importer (column).
Correlations with absolute value above 0.02 are
statistically significant at the 5 percent level. Data are
for 2002.
Table 7: Share of Trade by Destination- or Source-Country GDP Quintile, 2002
GDP
Quintile W R PC MWR MPC W R PC MWR MPC
1 0.20 0.01 0.31 0.02 0.46 0.25 0.01 0.14 0.32 0.28
2 0.18 0.01 0.32 0.01 0.48 0.14 0.02 0.26 0.17 0.41
3 0.16 0.01 0.28 0.02 0.53 0.16 0.01 0.26 0.11 0.46
4 0.09 0.00 0.20 0.02 0.69 0.18 0.01 0.22 0.10 0.49
5 0.07 0.01 0.22 0.02 0.67 0.14 0.01 0.20 0.07 0.57
Total 0.08 0.01 0.22 0.02 0.67 0.15 0.01 0.20 0.08 0.56
Notes: Table reports share of each type of firm in trade with countries in the noted GDP
quintile, i.e., rows sum to 1. Quintile 1 encompasses the smallest countries. Zeros are
due to rounding. Data are for 2002.
Exporting Value Importing Value
Table 8: Share of Trade Value by Firm Size, 2002
Firm Rank W R PC MWR MPC W R PC MWR MPC
Top 1% 0.47 0.52 0.60 0.52 0.57 0.41 0.54 0.77 0.45 0.56
Top 5% 0.73 0.76 0.83 0.85 0.84 0.67 0.76 0.90 0.77 0.83
Top 10% 0.84 0.85 0.91 0.92 0.92 0.79 0.85 0.95 0.87 0.91
Top 25% 0.95 0.94 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.93 0.95 0.99 0.97 0.98
Top 50% 0.99 0.98 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00
Top 100% 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Exporting Firms
Notes: Table reports the distribution of export and import value across noted firm-size
percentiles by firm type. Data are for 2002.
Importing Firms
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Table 9: Country-Level Gravity, 2002
ln(Distancec) -1.55 *** -1.63 *** -1.33 *** -1.64 *** -1.42 *** -0.31 0.01 -1.19 *** 0.24 -0.99 ***
0.21 0.18 0.17 0.24 0.20 0.23 0.31 0.26 0.41 0.26
ln(GDPc) 0.93 *** 0.86 *** 0.92 *** 1.03 *** 1.13 *** 1.15 *** 1.15 *** 1.27 *** 1.28 *** 1.28 ***
0.04 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.10 0.06
Constant 8.95 *** 8.34 *** 8.02 *** 5.07 * 4.67 ** -6.7 *** -12.4 *** -1.6 -16.1 *** -3.1
2.13 2.10 1.84 2.72 2.06 2.30 2.75 2.70 4.00 2.83
Observations
R2
ln(Distancec) -1.66 *** -1.47 *** -1.28 *** -1.67 *** -1.28 *** -0.20 0.00 -0.73 *** 0.37 -0.72 ***
0.19 0.14 0.14 0.21 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.16 0.24 0.16
ln(GDPc) 0.73 *** 0.68 *** 0.82 *** 0.74 *** 0.80 *** 0.97 *** 0.98 *** 0.96 *** 0.93 *** 0.97 ***
0.04 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.04
Constant 3.62 * 0.95 -1.36 1.37 -1.01 -15.5 *** -18.9 *** -10.7 *** -21.1 *** -11.0 ***
2.01 1.68 1.70 2.24 1.88 1.80 1.81 1.77 2.25 1.73
Observations
R2
ln(Distancec) 0.11 -0.16 * -0.05 0.02 -0.14 -0.11 0.01 -0.46 ** -0.13 -0.26
0.08 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.08 0.12 0.22 0.20 0.22 0.20
ln(GDPc) 0.20 *** 0.18 *** 0.11 *** 0.30 *** 0.33 *** 0.18 *** 0.17 *** 0.31 *** 0.36 *** 0.31 ***
0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.05
Constant 5.33 *** 7.39 *** 9.39 *** 3.70 *** 5.68 *** 8.83 *** 6.46 *** 9.10 *** 5.05 ** 7.91 ***
0.74 0.98 0.84 1.11 0.83 1.36 2.00 2.10 2.51 2.20
Observations
R2
Exports Imports
W R PC MWR MWR MPC
ln(Value)
MPC W R PC
157 174 171 143
0.53
147
ln(Intensive Margin)
173 166 175 157 174 171 143
0.69
ln(Extensive Margin)
172 147 170
0.76 0.69 0.74 0.66 0.81 0.72 0.59 0.73
173 166 175
170
0.75 0.73 0.79 0.68 0.73 0.74 0.74 0.79
174 171 143 172173 166 175 157
0.60 0.79
0.17 0.200.16 0.08 0.17
Notes: Table reports country-level OLS regressions for three dependent variables: log aggregate value per
country (top panel), the log number of firm-product observations with positive trade per country (extensive margin;
middle panel) and log average value per firm-product observation with positive trade per country (intensive
margin, bottom panel).  Robust standard errors reported below coefficients. Data are for 2002.
172 147 170
0.32 0.25 0.10 0.33 0.48
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